Over the last fifty-three years, the Unified Command Plan has been revised seventeen times in reaction to a changing strategic environment, changes in technology and the growing global commitment of U.S. forces. 2 Legislation adopted in 1979 specified that the Unified Command Plan be reviewed biennially. 3 The President approved the current Unified Command Plan on 29
January 1998.
In this latest review, there were no regional or functional changes pertaining to the continent of Africa. In fact, nothing in the language of this assessment directly addressed Africa. 4 While this may be consistent with Department of Defense declarations that the United States has "very little traditional strategic interests in Africa,"' it is a somewhat puzzling assertion in light of the fact that the United States has intervened militarily in the region more than twenty times since 1990.6 With the plethora of destabilizing conditions on the continent not only continuing but also increasing in the near term, now is the time to rethink the Unified Command Plan as it regards Africa. Responsibility for this region is divided amongst four of the five regional unified commands. Given
America's tendency not to anticipate African crises, the current Unified Command Plan cannot effectively protect America's security interests in Africa, and is unlikely to realize the Administration's articulated policy objectives in the region.
The existing Unified Command Plan should be revised to better secure U.S. regional objectives.
THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
The National Security Act of 1947 provides the legal basis for the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish unified combatant commands. 7 This legal authority is further codified in Title 10, United States Code. 8 Specifically, a unified combatant command is a military organization with a broad, continuing mission composed of forces from two or more military departments (i.e. Army, Navy, Air
Force) under the command of a single commander. 9 Unified commands are organized around a regional or functional mission.
The current UCP is composed of five regional and four African countries lack the resources to cope with natural disasters or to provide a health and educational infrastructure adequate to the challenges they face. Africa's problems will persist for generations, and the developed world will be confronted with Africa's tragedies into the indefinite future. A LOOK AT THE FUTURE To date, U.S. foreign policy in regards to Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has been reactive rather than proactive, and is generally driven by events rather than shaping events. 69 The consequences of this "limited engagement" is that If any region of the world warrants careful U.S. attention to potential coalitions to spare total reliance on U.S.
resources, surely that region is Africa. This is a key unified command role,' which can best be accomplished by creating a unified or sub-unified command exclusively for Sub-Saharan
Africa. The advantages of creating "an area oriented senior U.S. military command" 7 3 even if it is an "economy of force" command, would far outweigh any perceived disadvantages.
CONCLUSION
The question, then, is whether or not U.S. policy goals and priorities for Sub-Saharan Africa are aligned with the structural ability to secure them, realistic based on present funding levels, and adequate for anticipating and alleviating crises. The Office of the Secretary of Defense to endeavoring to develop a DOD-wide "Strategy for Africa" in support of an overall U.S. government strategy for engagement in the region.
Under the supervision of Dr. Nancy Walker, this effort has included informal consultations among OSD, Joint Staff, Unified Commands, DOS, the NSC and selected African officials.
However, the sheer bureaucratic difficulty of forging agreement among complex bureaucracies is itself an indictment of the current approach to unified command responsibility for Africa. 
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These include: regional stability; access to key persons, institutions, facilities; economic opportunity; safety of U.S. citizens; region free from weapons of mass destruction; region free of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats (such as terrorism, criminal cartels and epidemic diseases); regional governance that is humane, competent and accountable; sustained economic development; early information and warning; regional comity and cooperation; unthreatened natural environment; and security of regional borders.
Henk, "U.S. National Interests," p. 3. This is one source of comparison of funds distributed to Africa versus other regions of the world in several different categories; it does not include funding provided through USAID.
58 For instance, the permanent staff of the OAU is based in a CENTCOM country, but most of its member states are in EUCOM's area of responsibility, with some member states in ACOM and PACOM regions as well.
This makes it difficult for the U.S government to develop a single, unified program to assist the OAU in developing a conflict resolution capability (to include equipping/deploying military observer missions).
The U.S. faces a similar dilemma in managing its African Crisis response Initiative (ACRI).
Two African participants (Eritrea and Ethiopia) are in the CENTCOM region, with the other seven countries being EUCOM responsibilities.
That is why the ACRI is managed by an office in Washington, D.C. (currently at State) rather than in a unified command, where it more logically should be.
This also means that two different U.S. Army Special Forces groups are required for training ACRI participants, presenting the possibility at least of differing approaches or standards. Coordination meetings pertaining to security assistance programs and/or operations in Africa between EUCOM-CENTCOM-PACOM are extremely rare and largely ineffective.
This results in dissimilar (and often disjointed) security assistance programs in neighboring countries in which U.S. interests/objectives are identical, sending badly mixed signals.
One final example is "Natural Fire," a multilateral, peace operations exercise conducted by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1998.
When Kenya came to the U.S. asking for support and assistance in conducting this exercise, debate over funding issues between EUCOM and CENTCOM dragged on for so long that the African nations finally conducted the exercise with their own assets. Marley and Knight. 59 LtCOL Anthony Benade, South African National Defense Force and student at U.S Army War College (USAWC), and COL Dan Henk, Director of African Studies, USAWC.
Interview by author on 16 April 99. 60 USEUCOM'S responsibilities include supervision of security assistance programs such as excess defense articles (EDA) and international military education and training (IMET), military exercises (MEDFLAG and FLINTLOCK), special operations joint combined exchange training (JCET) and humanitarian de-mining operations (HDO)).
In addition, USEUCOM is engaged in two new programs unique to U.S. foreign policy in Africa: the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Center for Security Studies (ACSS). Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Campaign Plan for Sub-Saharan Africa, (1 July 1998), (no page numbers).
61 On 1 October 1998, USEUCOM assumed responsibility for the Western Slavic and Caucasus states of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
With the recent addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 19 independent nations now comprise the membership of NATO.
USEUCOM is also responsibility for the Partnership for Peace program with former Warsaw Pact nations.
Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Campaign Plan for Sub-Saharan Africa, (1 July 1998), p. 6.
62 On 1 October 1999, USCENTCOM assumes responsibility for the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgystan. 63 The CENTCOM engagement plan divides the area of responsibility into four sub-regions: Horn of Africa; Arabian Peninsula; Northern Red Sea States; and South and Central Asia. While there is no ranking of importance or priority amongst these sub-regions within CENTCOM, and in fact, efforts are made to ensure each region is afforded equal status, ongoing events in the Arabian Gulf have caused this not to be true in the near term.
(Telephonic interview on 16 April 1999 with USCENTCOM J5 action officer for Africa who declined to be named) 64 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1998, pp. 5, 52.
65 It would be unfair of course, to blame CENTCOM for the U.S. policy decision to withdraw from Somalia in the wake of the October 1993 ambush in Mogadishu.
However, a unified command more connected to African socio-political dynamics probably would have significantly affected the way in which the U.S. intervened in Somalia in 1992, possibly finding a more indigenously "African" solution.
It probably also would have exerted pressure on the intervening coalition to pursue more realistic and achievable objectives.
An "African" unified command also would have clearly understood the unfortunate regional ramifications of the world's superpower abandoning a regional commitment after a seemingly minor setback. 68 This is illustrated by the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in 1994.
Though a multi-million dollar U.S. commitment, Africans viewed it as slow, grudging and limited. This was due in part to the insistence of its commander that the mission be very short and limited in scope.
A year after the last Americans had departed, Ugandan military officers were still complaining of unpaid bills left in the hasty departure. For USEUCOM, the operation was a model of efficiency. For Africans, it was a clear statement that America -and its military -were fickle partners in efforts to resolve regional problems. This is the kind of perception on the part of regional allies that a dedicated unified command would be at pains to dispel.
Interview with COL Dan Henk, 17 April 1999. 
